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NOTE AND OPINION
AIR TRANSPORT-AIRLINE PILOTS' WAGE DIsPUTE.-[National Labor Relations Board] Section 13 of the Revised Air Mail Law1 provides that:
It shall be a condition upon the awarding or extending and the holding
of any air-mail contract that the rate of compensation and the working conditions and relations for all pilots, mechanics, and laborers employed by the
holder of such contract shall conform to decisions of the National Labor
Board. This section shall not be construed as restricting the .right of collective bargaining on the part of such employees.
Extensions of temporary air mail contracts embody agreements on the
part of the contractors to conform to decisions of the National Labor Board
and not to restrict the right of collective bargaining.
The National Labor Board was created on August 5, 1933, under authority
of the National Industrial Recovery Act,2 and in September, 1933, the Air
Line Pilots' Association and five air transport companies3 submitted a controversy over rates and methods of pay for pilots to the Board. Due to
uncertain conditions in the industry following the cancellation of the air mail
contracts, the opinion of the Board was not rendered until May 10, 1934.4
The decision continued the pay differentials existing on October 1, 1933, for
co-pilots and for flying over dangerous terrain. The Chairman of the Board
indicated that the rates provided in the opinion should apply if S. 3170 became law. That bill was approved on June 12, 1934, and became known as
the Revised Air Mail Law.5
Many of the operators paid the scale fixed in this opinion, and others
paid the equivalent thereof. However, some did not pay the scale-despite an
agreement to 'do so as a condition to the extension of their temporary contracts. As a result, complaint was made to the Post Office Department of the
alleged failure of Long and Harman, contractor on Air Mail Route 15, to pay
the scale provided for in the opinion of the Labor Board.
The Post Office Department held a formal hearing and a memorandum
decision was issued by Solicitor Karl Crowley on December 5, 1934, providing
in general that the Revised Air Mail Law requires the application of the
Labor Board's opinion to the contract in question. The memorandum permitted the contractor to conform to the scale set up, by January 1, 1935, or
have its contract cancelled as of January 15, 1935.
1. Public Act No. 308, 73rd Congress, 2d Session, approved June 12, 1934,

5 JOURNAL OF Ai LAW 462 (1934).
2. 48 Stat. 195.
3. American Airways, Inc.; Eastern Air Transport, Inc.; Transcontinental
& Western Air. Inc.: United Air Lines, Inc.; and western Air Express, Inc.
4. See 6 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 144 (1935).
5. Supra, note 1.
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Eventually appeals were taken by both the Air Line Pilots' Association,
in the case of Pilots I-lays, Kay, and Turner, and by Long and Harman.
These appeals were taken up by the new National Labor Relations Board
which had been created by Executive Order of June 29, 1934. 6
The decision of the National Labor Relations Board is as follows :7
Long and Harman Incorporated is subject to the Code of Fair Competition for the Air Transport Industry. This company secured an air-mail contract from the United States Government effective for the period of a year
from June 1, 1934, subject to satisfactory operation during a preliminary
period ending August 31, 1934. After receiving the contract, the company
hired several pilots. The terms of employment were made with each pilot
individually. The agreements were oral and the exact terms do not appear
in the record. From all the circumstances it appears that the term of employment was to be extended and the wage scale increased if the government
extended the contract beyond the preliminary period.
After a month or six weeks had elapsed the company asked the individuals to sign contracts embodying the wage scale being paid and definitely
ending the term of employment on August 31, 1934. The pilots refused to
sign such contracts, and at this time the company did not insist. The pilots,
much disturbed over what they considered to be the efforts of the company
to change their conditions of employment, began to meet together frequently.
A majority of the pilots became members of the Air Line Pilots' Association. L. S. Turner, one of the pilots, was the local representative of the
union. M. M. Kay, another pilot, met with the others although he was not
a member of the union. Apparently the pilots had banded together as a
defensive measure out of fear that the company would change the conditions
of employment. No demand was made on the company for a collective
agreement or for any concession in working conditions. Toward the end of
August the situation became acute. Harman, one of the owners, called the
pilots individually into his office to demand that they sign contracts continuing
the existing wage scale after August 31st. Two of them, Kay and Hays,
refused to sign. They asked to be allowed to see the contract but Harman
refused to allow them to read it until they had signed. Due to their refusal
to sign they lost their positions on August 31st. Turner was not asked to
sign a contract. The company discharged him on August 31st. The remainder of the pilots' group either signed the contracts or left the company
voluntarily.
Although the pilots had made no formal demands on the company for
recognition they did make informal requests on August 25th to be heard by
the employer as a group on the dispute over wages and other terms of employment. Turner, on August 25th, requested the operations manager to
arrange a meeting for the pilots with Harman. Later in the (lay Kay, the
non-union man, acting as the representative of' the others, asked Harman
to call in the pilots and talk over the disputed issues collectively. These
requests for a group meeting were turned down. Harman continued his
insistence that the men sign the individual contracts.
It is clear from the record that Harman was aware of the organization
of the company's pilots. We are convinced that the pilots brought home to
the company their desire to have the dispute considered on a collective rather
than an individual basis. We held in the Caldwell case* that insistence by the
company upon individual contracts in the face of an expressed request of the
employees for collective bargaining is a violation of Section 7(a). The situation in the present case is similar. The employees were acting in concert to
6. Issued under authority of Pub. Res. No. 44 of the 73rd Congress, 48
Stat. 1183.
1 7. It the Matter of Long and Harman, Inc. (Dallas, Texas) and G. L.
Hays, M. M. Kay, and L. S. Turner. Case No. 202. Hearing, January 10, 1935,
and Decision, ,February 21, 1935.
*In the Matter of Edward F. Caldwell & Company, Inc., and Lighting Equipment Workers Local Union No. 19427. Case No. 31. Decision, August 9. 1934.
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protect their working conditions and requested through their representative
an opportunity to deal collectively on the matter in dispute. The company
ignored the request for a collective discussion and instead insisted on individual bargaining leading to individual contracts as a condition to further
employment. We regard this action of the company as a violation of
Section 7(a).
L. S. Turner was not asked to sign a contract in August. The company
admits that its failure to offer Turner employment after August 31st amounted
to a discharge. A number of reasons are advanced for his discharge but we
are not impressed by them. Turner is an able pilot and during his employment with Long and Harman put in more hours of flying for the company
than any other pilot. The record shows that the company was hostile to
Turner because of his union affiliations. He was an active union man and
served as the local representative of the Air Line Pilots' Association. We
are convinced that his participation in the collective activity of the pilots, as
previously related, was a determining factor in his discharge.
Long and Harman Incorporated on January 1, 1935, transferred and assigned its air-mail contract to Braniff Airways, with the approval of the
Postmaster General. What obligation, if any, by the terms of the air-mail
contract and the Air Mail Act of 1934, may rest upon the assignee, Braniff
Airways, as a' result of this decision, is within the province of the Postmaster General to determine. Braniff Airways was not a party to the proceedings before us. J.ong and Harman Incorporated, according to our
information, has ceased to engage in flying operations. Reinstatement of
M. M. Kay, G. L. Hays and L. S. Turner to their former positions which
would be the normal restitution for the violation involved, has thus become
impracticable. The company should, however, pay to Messrs. Kay, Hays and
Turner back pay from August 31, 1934, the date of termination of their employment, to December 31, 1934, the date on which the company ceased flying
operations pursuant to its assignment of the air-mail contract to Braniff Airways. The amount of this restitution should be equal to the sums paid, during the period stated, to the men who were employed to fill the places of
Kay, Hays and Turner.
Findings: By insistence upon individual bargaining'in denial of a request for collective negotiations which resulted in forcing out of employment M. M. Kay and G. L. Hays and by discharging L. S. Turner under the
circumstances above set forth, Long and Harman Incorporated has violated
Section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act.
Enforcement: Unless within ten days from the date of this decision
Long and Harman Incorporated notifies this Board that it has paid to Kay,
Hays and Turner the money restitution above specified, the case will be
referred to the Compliance Division of the National Recovery Administration and to other agencies of the Government for appropriate action.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

BOARD.

Francis Biddle, Chairman,
H. A. Millis,
Edwin S. Smith.
F. D. F.
COMMENTS
AIRPORTS-MUNICIPAL-PLEDGING

OF FEDERAL LOAN.-[Arkansas]

OF GENERAL

REVENUE FOR REPAYMENT

Suit was brought to enjoin the City of Little
Rock from entering into a contract with the Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works for the purpose of obtaining a loan with which to construct and equip a municipal airport. The plan of repayment was threefold:
(1) By the pledging of the earnings of the airport; (2) by the transfer of
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money from the city's general revenue fund to an airport fund if the earnings were insufficient to pay the expenses of operation and maintenance; and
(3) by the payment of $3,800.00 per annum from its general revenue fund or
as much as would be necessary to repay the loan. The grounds of complaint
were constitutional limitations on the power of the municipality to use general
revenue funds for repayment of the loan. Held: Cities of the first class
may pledge their general revenue for repayment of loan for municipal airport on the condition that such money is expended after the city has paid
the expenses of its essential statutory functions. Parker v. City of Little
Rock, - Ark. -, 75 S. W. (2d) 243 (1934).
In 1934, the constitution of Arkansas was amended to protect the taxpayers frorri the overburdening debts of counties and cities by stipulating
that fiscal affairs must be conducted on a sound financial basis., However,
this was soon considered insufficient to accomplish the purpose and in 1926
another amendment was enacted with the provision that municipalities shall
not lend their credit nor issue bonds with certain exceptions but with a proviso allowing cities of the first and second classes to issue bonds with the
consent of the electorate to be obtained on each issue.2 In 1929, the state
legislature passed a statute allowing cities of the first class to acquire and
own airports.8
The respondent city availed itself of this provision and
planned to effect its accomplishment by means of a Federal loan. The ques4
tion of the necessary bond issue was not submitted to the people.
When the validity of such action by the municipality was questioned in
the Supreme Court, the majority decided in favor of its constitutionality in
light of the amendment of 1924, and omitted any discussion of the amendment
of 1926. The opinion does not make it clear whether the Federal loan was
evidenced by bonds. The impression is given that the majority of the court
1. "The fiscal affairs of counties, cities and incorporated towns shall be
conducted on a sound, financial basis, and no county court or levying board or
agent of any county shall make or authorize any contract to make any allowance for any purpose whatsoever in excess of the revenue from all sources for
the fiscal year in which said contract or allowance is made:" Ark.'Const. Am.
XI. (1924).
2. "Neither the State nor any city, county, town or other municipality in
this State shall ever lend its credit for any purpose whatever; nor shall any
county, city, town or municipality ever issue any interest-bearing evidences of
indebtedness, except such bonds as may be authorized by law to provide for and
secure the payment of the indebtedness existing at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution of 1874. and the State shall never issue any interest-bearing
treasury warrants or scrip: provided that cities of the first and second class, may
issue by and with the consent of a majority of the qualified electors of said
municipality voting on the question at an election held for the purpose, bonds in
sums and for the purposes approved by such majority at such election as follows: . . . for the purchase, development and improvement of public parks and
flying fields located either within or without the corporate limits of such municipality . . . said election shall be held at such time as the city council may
designate by ordinance, which ordinance shall specifically state the purpose for
which the bonds are to be issued, and if for more than one purpose, provision
shall be made in said ordinance for balloting on each separate purpose . . .
Ark. Const. Am. XVI. (1926).
3. The final step of referendum by the electorate as means of check is
widely used. After discussing the varied means available for the initiating of
local airport development, Mr. Grover says, "It must not be forgotten that state
constitutions and general revenue statutes frequently call for a referendum upon
an increase in the tax levy for a new project, and for a bond issue. Thus even
where the power of acquisition and maintenance seems to rest in the local governing body without ratification, the electorate retains indirect control by its
power to throttle necessary financial measures:" R. L. Grover, "Legal Basis
of Municipal Airports," 5 JOURNAL OF AnR LAW 410, 418 (1934).
4. See dissenting opinion at page 247.
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could envision no harm in allowing the city to take advantage of the Federal
government's generosity in aiding the city in advancing its public activities on
the theory that the city would be limited in its total expenditures to the annual
revenue and that only the amount remaining from such total after all the
necessary municipal expenses had been paid would be available for other
public expenditures. Therefore, the court was obliging in overlooking the
constitutional mandate of 1928.
The dissenting judges pointed out that the very essence of the latter
amendment was put aside by the action of the majority in refusing to take
notice of its existence. If the means adopted by the city in pledging its
revenue was that of a bond issue as it seems to have been from the discussion in the dissent,5 it is difficult to give any satisfactory legal explanation for
the majority's view. The public opinion of the state seems to indicate a hostility to the extension of such financial activities of officials without the sanction of the electorate and it appears unwise to hinder the public support of
municipal aviation by the deliberate failure to follow the procedure adopted
by the people themselves. The advantages of the attempt to gain favor by
granting the opportunity to the electorate to put their stamp of approval upon
the project would seem to outweigh the possible disadvantage of a vote disapproving the plan, since once the support of the city's inhabitants is obtained
by respecting their regulations a large gain in public support in many phases
of the project will have been the beneficial outcome of cooperation.6
HORTENSE
CONTRACTS-INFANTS-AVIATION

MECHANICS

COURSE AS A

KLEIN.

NECESSARY.-

[New York] Plantiff enrolled in the defendant school for a course in aviation mechanics; his father paid part of the tuition fee and the plaintiff paid
the remainder. After completing the course, he attempted to rescind the contract on the ground of his infancy and he brought this action, by his guardian
ad litem, to recover the tuition fee. The training course was held to be a
necessary. Defendant had judgment on the additional ground that this was
an original undertaking of the father for the benefit of the son. Curtis v.
Roosevelt Aviation School, Inc., Municipal Court of New York, Borough of

Brooklyn, 6th Jud. Dist., May 25, 1934.
The rule is everywhere established that an infant, when his. parent or
guardian is either unable or unwilling to furnish them, may bind himself for
necessaries; and the term necessaries includes food, clothing, medical care,
and such education and training as may be suitable to his estate and expectations.1 In the United States, a common school education is generally held to
5.

"In the Little Rock case thousands of dollars of the general revenue of

the city Is pledged to pay this bond issue:" dissenting opinion.
6. The city of Pine Bluff called an election to determine whether the city
should issue bonds for the building of city sewer system after an agreement had
been made between the city engineers and the Civil Works Administration:
Atkinson v. City of Pine Bluff, Ark. -, 76 S. W. (2d) 982 (1934).

1.

Co. Lit. 172a.

But it must be shown that the contracting infant has no

parent or guardian able or willing to furnish the necessaries:
Kline v. L'Amoureux, 2 Paige (N. Y.) 419 (1831) : Mauldin v. So. Shorthand d Business
University, 126 Ga. 681, 55 S. E. 922 (1906): McKanna v. Merry, 61 Ill. 177
(1871).
Any recovery from an infant is upon a quasi-contractual basis:
Wallin V. Highland Park Co.. 127 Ia. 131, 102 N. W. 839 (1905).
Whether or
not the education was suitable to the infant's station and expectations is a
matter for the Jury: Cory v. Cook. 24 R. I. 421, 53 A. 315 (1902-bookkeeping) ;
Nielson v. International Text Book Co., 106 Me. 104, 75 A. 330 (1909-course in
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be a necessary as a matter of law, 2 whereas, except in unusual circumstances,
a professional or classical education is generally held not to be one.8 However, training whereby an infant may learn a trade suitable to his position
is a necessary. 4 Thus training for the occupations of pattern maker, cabinet
maker, and farmer is a necessary.
Hamilton v. Bennett 5 is authority for the proposition that flying instructions do not fall within the category of necessaries for which an infant might
bind himself, but in that case it did not appear that the course of training was
such as to qualify the infant for employment as a pilot. It would seem that
to be deemed a necessary a course of flying instructions would have to prepare one for employment in the field of commercial aviation.
In deciding whether or not a given training course in the field of aviation
is to be classed as a necessary, circumstances in addition to the conventional
inquiries with regard to the infant's having a parent or guardian able and
willing to supply him with suitable education and training and whether the
cost of the training is reasonably proportionate to the estate and expectations
of the infant will merit serious consideration. The course of training should
be such as would enable a student successfully completing it to comply with
the license requirementsO for airplane mechanic, engine mechanic, or commercial pilot of United States Department of Commerce. If the course consists of flying instruction, the court should be satisfied that the infant is
physically qualified to obtain a commercial pilot's license, in the event of his
successful completion of the course. In other words, the course of training
should be such that the student, upon the successful completion thereof, would
be qualified to pursue his chosen trade.
A minority in number of American jurisdictions require an infant seeking
to rescind a contract on the ground of infancy, when the contract is a beneficial one although not strictly for a necessary, to return to the other party
such consideration as the infant may have received, or the reasonable value
thereof. 7 Thi case was brought in such a jurisdiction. Because of the
impossibility of returning the benefits in a case such as this, the nature of
the training course might not need to be as closely scrutinized as would be
electrical engineering) ; Sisson v. Schultz. 251 Mich. 553, 232 N. W. 253 (1980musical education) ; Crandall v. Coyne Electrical School, Inc., 256 Il. App. 322
(1930-electrical training); Wallin v. Highland Park Co., supra (pharmacy);
Mauldin v. Southern Shorthand t Business University, supra (stenography).
The burden of proving that the training is suitable to the infant's station is on
the party trying to hold the infant: Crandall v. Coyne Electrical School, Inc.,
supra.
2.
(1912)
239 N.
note 1
3.
(1879)

International Text Book Co. v. Counelly, 206 N. Y. 188, 99 N. E. 722
; Middlebury College v. Chandler, 16 Vt. 683 (1844) ; Halsted v. Halsted,
Y. Supp. 422 (1930) ; Crandall v. Coyne Electrical School, Inc., supra
Mauldin v. So. Shorthand &. Biksiness University. supra note 1.
Gayle v. Hayes, 79 Va. 542 (1884); Turner v. Gaither, 83 N. C. 857
Internat4onal Text Book, Co. v. Connelly, supra note 2; Middlebury

College V. Chandler, supra note 2: Mauldin v. So. Shorthand d Business University, supra note 1; Halsted v. Halsted, supra note 2.
4. Nielson v. International Text Book Go.. supra note 1; Wilhelm v. Hardman, 13 Md. 140 (1858) : McKnight V. Hogg, 1 Tread. (S. C.) 117 (1812);
Cooper V. Simmons, 7 Hurl. & N. 707, 719 (1862) ; Pardy V. American ShipWindlass Co., 20 R. I. 147, 37 A. 706 (1897).
5. 74 S. J. 122-D (Eng., 1930).
. 6. See U. S. Department of Commerce Aeronautics Bulletin No. 7, ch. 5,
ep 18-26: ch. 6, pp. 27-29. See also Department of Commerce Aeronautics Bulein No. 1, pp. 39-43.
7. Riley v. Mallory. 33 Conn. 201 (1863) ; Heath v. Stevens, 48 N. H. 251
(1869) ; Mutual Milk & Cream Co. V. Prigge, 98 N. Y. Supp. 458 (1906) ; Wantsch
v. Wuertz. 140 N. Y. Supp. 573 (1913) ; Lown v. Spoon, 143 N. Y. Supp. 275
(1913); Myers v. Hurley Motor Car Co.. 273 U. S. 18, 47 S. Ct. 277 (1927);
Pettit v. Liaton, 97 Ore. 464, 191 P. 660 (1920).
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the case if the controversy arose in a jurisdiction following the majority rule.
FRANCIS D. ROTH.
CONSTITUTIONAL
GATION

LAW-STATE

OF LEGISLATIVE

LEGISLATION-AIRCRAFT

PowER.-[Minnesota]

LICENSING-DELE-

The decision in the second

Minnesota case testing the constitutionality of their act. to regulate aeronautics has been handed down.' The suit was brought against the members
of the Minnesota Aeronautics Commission under the Declaratory Judgments
Act. The plaintiff contended that the requirement of a Federal license for
both plane 2 and pilot s was an unwarranted delegation of legislative power.
With this the court was in accord. Nieman v. Minnesota Aeronautics Commission, District Court of Ramsey County, Minnesota, 2nd Judicial District,
January, 1935.
The logic of the opinion eludes the present writer's comprehension. The
view is taken that it was permissible for the legislature to provide that aircraft operating within the state should conform with respect to design, construction, and airworthiness to the standards prescribed by the United States.
But when that body conferred the power to grant such licenses on the Department of Commerce, says the court, it delegated its legislative power. Is it
not obvious that before a license is conferred, the legislative process has been
completed? Here the legislature adopted as its own the standards of the Air
Commerce Act which consist of the rules and regulations promulgated by the
Commerce Department. When it had done that, only the ministerial or
quasi judicial function of granting the license remained. The decision of the
court would seem to be based upon a questionable interpretation of the
nature of a delegation of legislative power.
The outcome of the case has resulted in a proposed amendment to the
Minnesota Aeronautics Act, whereby licenses for intrastate flying may be
obtained either through the Commerce Department or the Minnesota Aeronautics Commission. 4 The passage of such bill would be extremely regretable. It would undo what the American Bar Association Committee on Aeronautical Law and the National Association of State Aviation Officials have
accomplished only after a fight of many years. A Federal license requirement
is the only practical solution of the licensing problem. It is the only means
by which the essential uniformity can be assured. But the bill will do more
than result in a divergence of standards. It will cause unnecessary duplication, less efficiency, and increased expense which the state may find itself
unable to bear. And finally, it seems unreasonable to suppose that anyone
who can qualify-for a Federal license will apply to the state. In the interest
of aeronautical progress, the present code should be permitted to stand.
CECILE

1. For earlier mention, see comment
(January, 1935).
2. Minnesota Laws. 1933. C. 38. §2.
3. Ibid. §3.

4.

in 6
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The arbitrary action so feared by Judge Michael is much more likely

to arise under the proposed legislation since no hearing is provided either on
refusal or revocation of a license.
There is, however, such provision in the
Federal licensing act. And, further, should the court's view be given weight,

the proposed section 2(a) which provides that the Minnesota Aeronautics Commission may require an approved type certificate issued by the Department of
Commerce. can be said to be an invalid delegation.
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INSURANCE-CONSTRUCTION OF "ENGAGED IN" AND "PARTICIPATING IN"
AVIATION CLAUSES.-[Federal and New Mexico] Recently two cases have

been decided which involve a new and interesting angle on the problem of the
construction of aviation clauses in insurance policies. The first dealt with
the situation where the insured was killed, while a passenger, by a fall of
the airplane during a scheduled trip. The policy contained the following provision: "This double indemnity benefit will not apply if the insured's death
resulted . . . from engaging, as a passenger or otherwise, in submarine or
aeronautic operations." The plaintiff was defeated in the lower court. Held,
on appeal, affirmed. The clause was free from ambiguity and contained the
specific provision "as passenger or otherwise" which made it all-inclusive;
and it therefore exempted the insurer from liability. Mayer v. New York
Life Insurance Co., 74 F. (2d) 118, C. C. A. 6th, December 7, 1934.
The appellant contended that the word "engaged" denotes continuity,
frequency, and regularity, and is not synonymous with "participating" and
therefore does not cover the casual passenger. He argued further that there
are different classes of passengers, one composed of those who are engaged
in aeronautic operations-such as an executive of the company-, and another
comprising casual passengers who ride for pleasure or' transportation and
who are not engaged in aeronautic operations; the clause referred to the
former class, but not the latter. The court gave no weight to these contentions, but referred to and followed the case of Goldsmith v. New York Life
Insurance Co., There the court followed the same reasoning in reaching its
conclusions as the court did in the principal case. There was a dissenting
opinion in the Goldsmith case, that followed the reasoning and interpretation
that was advanced by the appellant in the principal case, that the phrase
"passenger or otherwise" pertained only to passengers who were affiliated
with airplane companies. However. this dissenting view seems to be an unreasonable and technical interpretation of the clause and contrary to the intent
of its framers. A case reaching a seemingly contrary result to that of the
Goldsmith case was Provident Trust Co. of Philadelphia v. Equitable Life
Assurance Society.2 The policy contained a clause which was the same as in
the principal case, except that it ended with "aeronautic expeditions" instead

of "aeronautic operations." The court held that since the ordinary meaning
of the words should be applied to this phrase, a passenger riding in a plane
3
would not be engaging in "aeronautic expeditions" and allowed recovery.
the
by
that
raised
from
distinguishable
of
course,
was,
But the problem
clauses "engaged in" and "participating in."
In the Goldsmith case, the court made an exhaustive survey of the past
decisions dealing with the problem and concluded that they fell into two

classes, allowing recovery to a passenger, or prohibiting it. The first classification is as follows: "The words, 'engaged in aeronautics or aviation,'
'engaged in aeronautic activity,' 'engaged in aeronautic expeditions,' do allow
4
recovery in the case of an ordinary passenger in an airplane." Many cases
can be found that support this conclusion.

5

1. 69 F. (2d) 273 (C. C. A. 8th, 1983).
2. 316 Pa. 21, 172 A. 701 (1933).
3. Contra, Gibbs v. Equtable Life Assurance Co., 256 N. Y. 208, 176 N.
E. 144 (1929).
4. Supra note 1.
5. Benefit Assn. of Ry. Employers v. Hayden, 175 Ark. 565, 299 S. W. 995
(1927); In this case the Policy excluded from coverage fatal Injury "while
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It can be seen that this is primarily a problem of construction and interpretation of the various clauses. Therefore, it would be advisable to consider the proper definitions of the words in these clauses. The word "engaged" has been, in previous cases, defined as a "word that denotes action;
it means take part in."
Also it has been defined as a "word that means to
take part in, be employed in, however the employment may arise."7 It has
often been pointed out that the word denotes regularity and frequency as
opposed to the word "participating" which signifies the contrary. Thus
when the word "engaged" is used in an aviation clause of an insurance policy
it has almost uniformly been construed as affecting only those actually and
permanently affiliated with and employed in the industry. Therefore, the
casual passenger is covered by the policy and the insurer is not freed from
liability in case of the insured's death by flying. The appellant in the principal case consequently maintained that the case fell into that class. To
answer this argument it is necessary to examine the clause more closely. It
is seen that the word, "engaged," is modified by the phrase "passenger or
otherwise." The court said in this respect, "Applying their ordinary meanings
to these words it is in fact difficult to conceive of any way in which one
could engage 'as a passenger' in aeronautic operations except by riding in a
plane. The words 'as a passenger or otherwise' define and modify the words
'engaging . . . in aeronautic operations,' and are unlimited in scope." The
idea of regularity and frequency is modified by the latter part of the clause,
and is thus nullified. This seems a very reasonable interpretation and one
that more nearly corresponds with the apparent intent of the party who
framed the contract of insurance. It seems quite obvious that this clause
engaged in aeronautics or under water navigation."

The insured was killed

while a passenger in an aeroplane. It was held that his death was covered by
the policy; that the word "engaged" in its ordinary sense means something more
than taking a trip as a passenger.
In Masonic Accident Insurance Co. v. Jackson, 200 Ind. 472, 164 N. E. 628
(1929), the policy excluded death while "engaged in aviation or ballooning."
The insured was killed while passenger in an aeroplane. The court followed the

Hayden case, supra, and held the Insured's death while a passenger was covered

by the policy.
In Peters v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 133 Misc. 780, 233 N. Y. Supp.
500 (1929). the policy excluded death "from having been engaged in aviation or
submarine operations or military or naval service in time of war." The insured
was killed while a passenger in an airplane. The language was held to be
ambiguous, because it might mean aviation in time of war, and, further, because
the words, "engaged in aviation." convey "something more than occasional
participation" in aviation. Therefore, the insured's death was held to be covered by the policy.
In Gits v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 32 .F. (2d) 7 (C. C. A. 7th. 1929), the policy
excluded from double indemnity death "from engaging in submarine or aeronautio operations."
The insured was a passenger in an airplane when killed.
The court followed the case of Masonic Accident Insurance Co. v. Jackson, supra,
saying ". . . The intent and scope of the clause is ambiguous and involved in
doubt. The ambiguity and doubt are emphasized by the facility with which the
insurer could have included passengers within the exception, were it so intended."
In Gibbs v. quitable Life Assurance Society of the U. S., supra note 8, the
policy excluded from double indemnity benefits death resulting from "engaging,
as a passenger or otherwise, in submarine or aeronautic expeditions."
The
insured was killed while a passenger in a common carrier airplane. It was contended that he was not engaged in an aeronautic expedition and that his death
called for double indemnity. The court held that the policy which was issued in
1924 must be construed in the light of conditions then prevailing, and that it
was intended to exclude from double indemnity death from riding in an airplane
as a passenger. See, Charette v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America, 202 Wis.
470, 232 N. W. 848 (1930) ; Woodmen of the World v. Compton, 140 Ark. 313,
215 S. W. 672 (1919).
6. Barnett V. Merchant's Life Ins. Co. of Des Moines. Ia., 87 Oklo. 42, 208
P. 271 (1922).
7. Nowlan v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 88 W. Va. 563, 107 S. E.
177, 178 (1921).
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was born of a desire to evade the construction the courts have made of
previous clauses of this nature and was an attempt to make an all-inclusive
exemption from liability in the case of death due to airplane accident.
The second recent case falls into the other classification. There the insured's wife and beneficiary sued the insurer on the policy for the death of
her husband. He was riding as a casual, invited passenger in a plane owned
and piloted by a friend of his, and was killed by its fall. The company
denied liability under the policy because of a clause which read, "This policy
does not cover death or other loss due to disease, whether acquired by accident or otherwise, or sustained as the result of participation in aviation,
aeronautics or subaquatics,

...

"

The lower court found for the plaintiff.

Held, on appeal, reversed. The court interpreted the clause to read, "This
policy does not cover death or other loss . . . sustained as a result of participating in aviation or aeronautics." Although the clause was poorly drafted,
this was held to be the logical and sensible meaning, and a strained or unreasonable meaning would not be allowed although it might be grammatically
correct. Therefore, under this construction the insurer was not liable for
this type of risk: Sneddon. v. Massachusetts Protective Association, Inc.,
-

N. M. -,

39 P. (2d) 1023 (Jan. 10, 1935).

The appellee in the case relied on two arguments. The first and more
important was that there is no real distinction between the term "engaged in
aviation" and "participation in aviation." However, as the court pointed out,
this is contrary to the authorities. The Goldsmith case stated the second
classification of these cases to include: "Those clauses using the words
'participating as a passenger or otherwise in aeronautics or aviation,' 'participating as a passenger or otherwise in aeronautic activity,' or 'participating
as a passenger or otherwise in aeronautic expeditions.' [These] cover a
passenger in an airplane." 8 Many cases can be found supporting this rule.9
The word "participating" has been defined as ".

.

. to receive or have a

part in a share of; to partake of; experience in common with others;
. ." 10 Participating, in reference to these.clauses, has been used to denote
8. Suvra note 1.
9. Bew v. Travellers Ins. Co.. 95 N. J. Law 533, 112 A. 859 (1921) ;in this
case the policy excluded "injuries . . . sustained . . . while participating in
or in consequence of having participated in aeronautics." The insured was a
passenger in an airplane when killed. His death was held to be excluded from
coverage.
In Pittman v. Lamar Life Ins. Co., 17 F. (2d) 370 (C. C. A. 5th, 1927), cert.
denied 274 U. S. 750. 47 S. Ct. 764 (1927), the policy excluded death -while

participating or as a result of participating in any submarine or aeronautic
expeuition, as passenger or otherwise."

The insured who was part owner of

the airplane, was killed by the moving propeller blade as he passed near the
front of the machine after landing. He had just returned from a flight during
which his partner operated the plane. It was held that he was killed while
participating in an aeronautic activity.
In Head V. N. Y. Life Ins. Go., 43 F. (2d) 517 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930), the
policy excluded from double Indemnity "death . . . from participating, as a
passenger or otherwise, in aviation or aeronautics." It was held that a passenger
In an airplane flying in the air participates in aeronautics and the plaintiff could
not recover double indemnity for death of the insured while riding as a passenger.
In First Nati. Bank of Chattanooga v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 62 F.
(2d) 681 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933). the policy excluded from double indemnity benefits
death "from participation in aeronautics . . . operations." The insured was
president of an aviation company operating around Chattanooga. He had a
student. pilot permit and took a pleasure trip to Florida in one of the company's

airplanes, which was operated by a company pilot. The plane crashed and the
insured was killed. Although not acting as pilot on the trip, he was more than
a passive participant in the venture. It was held his beneficiary could not
collect double indemnity.
10. Bew v. Travellers Ins. Co., supra note 9.
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casual and infrequent trips in an airplane, while the word "engaged," as
defined above, denotes actual operation of an airplane. In the case of Price
v. Prudential Insurance Co.,"

the court said as to this distinction, "Being

engaged in aviation operations means taking 'iart in the operations of an
aeroplane in some direct way, other than merely participating in the.aeroautics by being in an airplane while it is in the air." The courts have uniformly -followed this distinction throughout the cases. Where the word
"engaged" is used recovery is allowed for the insured who meets death while
a passenger, unless the words "as a passenger" are added. However, where
the word "participating" is used the insured is not covered by the policy if a
passenger. There has been no reported case that has allowed recovery where
the word "participating" has been used with the exception of the case of
12
There the insured was killed by
Tierney v. Occidental Life Insurance Co.
a propeller blade after leaving the plane, and the court held that since the
flight was over, the fact that he was struck by the propeller blade, and not
the flight itself, was the proximate cause of his death.'3
The appellee in the Sneddon case also contended that the clause referred
only to loss and death due to diseases arising from participating in aviation
or aeronautics. The court admitted that the clause was poorly drafted and
that it would have been much clearer if the words "death or other loss" had
been repeated before the word "sustained." However, they refused to permit
this technical and unreasonable construction when the intent of the framers
so obviously was that no recovery should be allowed for loss or death sustained as a result of participating in aviation or aeronautics. Thus it is clear
that this case comes under the second classification, and the court followed
the long line of precedent in interpreting the word "participating."
The above indicates the manner in which the courts have construed aviation insurance clauses in the past. When most of these clauses were framed,
the aviation industry was in its infancy. The terms used in the clauses had
entirely different meanings at the time, because aviation was considered an
adventurous undertaking for the pleasure of a few daring people. However, the courts today apply the present day meanings to terms which are in
many cases substantially different. 14 This is due to the rapid growth of aviation. It is now a recognized means of transportation, carrying thousands of
passengers a year and still expanding rapidly. Therefore, due to .the construction of the clauses, which were framed some years ago, in the light of
the present day knowledge of aviation the insurance companies have been
forced to assume risks that they never intended to contract for. They have
naturally desired to relieve themselves of this liability and have changed the
wording of the clauses, intending to abolish their ambiguity and broaden
their scope.
During the last ten years the courts have formed the two lines of precedent that are discussed above. The most recent clauses have been designed
11. 98 Fla. 1044, 124 S. 817 (1929).
12. 89 Cal. App. 778. 265 P. 400 (1928).
13. Contra, Pittman v. Lamar Life Ins. Co., supra note 9.
14. See Vaughn Miller. "Aeronautic Clauses in Life Insurance," 11 Boston
L.Rev. 485 (1931) ; G. L. Llovd. "Aviation Insurance," 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
543 (1930) ; W. C. Crowdus, "Aviation Insurance," 2 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 176
(1931)
K. J. Kremlick. "Aviation Insurance Law," 2 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 524
(1931)
Ralph Straub. "The Air Passenger and His Insurance," 33 Law Notes
105 (1929) ; and note by M. H. Braun, in 2 Air L. Rev. 77 (1931).
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to avoid any controversy as to their meaning. Thus it seems that the clause
used in the Mayer case, "engaging, as a passenger or otherwise, in submarine.
or aeronautic operations," meets both classifications. The word "engaged"
takes care of those that are permanently connected with the aviation industry,
and the phrase, "as a passenger," excludes the casual passenger from the
risk insured against. Two courts have construed this clause and both arrive
at the same conclusion. Thus it seems that the insurance companies have
succeeded in framing a clause that will convey their intention and free them
5
from a risk not bargained for.'
WILLIAM G. KARNES.
NEGLIGENCE-CONTRIBUTORY

NEGLIGENCE-COLLISION

WITH

HAYRAKE

ON

Plaintiff's airplane was returning
to defendant's airport from the northwest, in a northwest wind. The plane
skirted the west side of the field, circled the south end, and then approached
the field from the southeast. In landing, the pilot was blinded by the sun,
and the plane struck a hayrake which was on the runway. Plaintiff sued for
the resulting damage to the plane.' In the lower court, the jury found for
the plaintiff. Held: on appeal, reversed. The pilot was negligent, as a matter
of law, if he proceeded to land voluntarily at a time when he was unable,
because his vision was obscured, to see the rake. Davies v. Oshkosh Airport, Inc., 214 Wis. 236, 252 N. W. 602 (1934), 1934 U. S. Av. R. 122.
RUNWAY-ORDINARY

CARE.-[Wisconsin]

Governmental regulation 2 and flying technique require that normally a
pilot, in landing a plane, do so into the wind, which in this case was from the
northwest, with the result that plaintiff's pilot was landing into the sun, as
well as into the wind. The decision in the instant case seems correct, since
the pilot should have "spotted" the hayrake on the runway as he was skirting
the west side of the field when the sun was at his back; but the court, in
laying down a specific standard of care for all cases, has only acted to involve itself in all manner of future difficulties.$ In the principal case the
pilot's failure to circle the field until he could get a clear view of the runway
when his vision was unobstructed by the sun did constitute negligence. However, a different case would be presented if the pilot had been flying, for
15. There are clauses in use today that allow recovery to a passenger
killed while riding in a plane: see the case of Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.
v. Conway, 252 N. Y. 449, 160 N. E. 642 (1930). For notes, see 30 Colum. Law
Rev. 572 (April, 1930) and 78 Uni. of Penn. Law Review 914 (May, 1930):
there was involved a policy that stated, "Death as a result of service, travel or
flight in any species of aircraft, except as a fare-paying passenger, is a risk not
assumed under this policy." The court held a clause of this nature was consistent with the insurance statutes of the state. Also see the case, LeidiL76a v.
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. of California, 172 La. 41, 135 S. 85 (1931),

note in 2 JOURNAL Or AIR LAW 602 (1931), which involved a policy with a
clause that limited the liability of the company to the return of the paid premiums if the death of the insured occurred in aerial navigation, except as a farepaying passenger in a licensed commercial aircraft, operated by a licensed pilot,
and flying in a regular civil airway between definite established air ports.

The

Insured was killed while a passenger in an airplane and his widow, the plaintiff
In the case, was allowed recovery.
1.

For an exhaustive treatment of the duties involved in a similar factual

situation, see comment. 4 JOURNAL o AIR LAW 276 (1933).
2. U. S. Department of Commerce, Air Commerce Regulations, 675(a)
(1931).
8. The same situation was presented in B. 6 6. R. Co. v. Goodman, 275
U. S. 66, 48 S. Ct. 25 (1927) ; and Pokora v. Wabash Ry Co., 54 Ill. 580 (1934)

see note by S. N. Rittenberg, 29 Ill. L. R. 253 (1934).
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instance, in a fog; the court's standard would force the cautious pilot to remain in the air until the fog lifted.
It has been held that, in the absence of statute, the rules applicable to
4
In order to
torts on land generally govern accidents involving airplanes.
arrive at the decision in the instant case, the court accepted as a standard of
reasonable care, the expert testimony that good practice requires that a pilot

make as many turns as possible before landing so as to be able to see what
is on the ground below. The court then reached its result by applying a
formula of doubtful value even in automobile cases, to the effect that the
driver of an automobile must halt when his vision is obscured; therefore a
pilot, in order to be free from contributory negligence, must continue to circle
about the field until he has a sufficient lookout to ascertain that the runway
is clear!
The court seems to have erred in at least two respects:

(1)

The analogy

between driving an automobile and landing an-airplane is not perfect.

When

confronted by an obstruction to the vision, the activity required of a pilot to
free himself of the charge of negligence is not comparable to that required

of a motorist. However inconvenient it may be, it is a perfectly practicable
thing to stop an automobile at the side of the road to wait for the removal of
the obscurity, since such a position of repose can presumably be maintained
indefinitely.

But in flying an airplane there is certainly a limit to the time a

pilot can continue to circle a field. Nor can it be said that there is no increase in danger to the pilot, his passenger, and persons on the ground while
he thus waits for visibility to improve over an airport; the exact opposite is
often the case. It is a matter of common knowledge that a pilot who hesitates, hoping for a light fog to clear and afford perfect vision, is likely to be

rewarded for his caution with an increasing density of fog.
law referred

to in the instant case,

(2) The rule of

that the driver of an automobile is

negligent as a matter of law if he proceeds when his vision is obstructed, is
not universal but is subject to modification and exceptions based on considera-

tions of necessity and practicability.

For example, (a)

a driver who en,

countered dense fog, being in the country with no facilities for putting up for

the night, was held to be justified in proceeding through the fog on his way
home with caution commensurate with progress under these conditions;5
(b) a driver who proceeded when his vision was interfered with by glaring
4. Wilson v. Colonial Air Transport. Inc.. 278 Mass. 420, 180 N. E. 212,
83 A. . R. 329. 1932 U. S. AV. R. (1932): Read V. New York City Airport, 145
Misc. 294, 259 N. Y. S. 245, 1933 U. S. Av. R. 31 (1932) ; Greunke v. No. Am.
Airways Co., 201 Wis. 565. 230 N. W. 618. 69 A. L. fR. 295, 1930 TI. S. Av. fR.
126 (1930).
The rule is that every person shall use ordinary care not to injure another:
Gre utke v. No. Am. Airways Co.. supra, discussed in 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 363
(1930).
Ordinary care is such care as the ordinarily prudent person would use
under the same or similar circumstances: N. Y. S. & W.
y. v. Therer, 221 Fed.
571 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915). cert. denied, 238 U. S. 621. 35 Sup. Ct. 603. 59 L. Ed.
1493; Greunke v. No. Am. Airwaps Co., supra. The law imposes on every person the duty of using ordinary care for his own protection against Injury:
N. Y. S. & W. Ry. v. Therer, supra.
There can be no recovery for injuries if the person injured was guilty of
contributory negligence: Peterson v. Klitgaard. 212 Cal. 516. 299 P. 54 (1931) ;
Fletcher V. Bostnn &, Maine Rit.. 187 Mass. 463. 73 N. E. 552. 105 Am. St. Rep.
414 (1905) ; 20 R. C. L. Negligence (1929), 99, 887. Nor can there be recovery
if the Injury results from the negligence of the plaintiff's representative or
agent, because the negligence of the representative or agent is, in law, the
negligence of his principal: McLaughlin v. Pittsburgh RBs., 252 Pa. 32, 97 A.
107 (1916) ; 20 R. C. L., Negligence (1929), 148, §121, and 159, §1383.
5. Johnson v. State, 104 Misc. 395, 175 N. Y. S. 299 (1918), ac'd. 186 App.
Div. 389, 173 N. Y. S. 701 (1919), aff'd. 227 N. Y. 610, 125 N. t. 919 (1919).
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lights, was held not to be negligent in not stopping, or so retarding his speed
as to eliminate absolutely all chance of danger to a person who might be on
the highway ahead of him, for, "if it were the duty of the driver to come
to a practical standstill, it would be the duty of the other driver, who would
no doubt be blinded in the same way, to act in the same manner, and it
would lead to a practical stoppage of traffic;"O (c) it was held that, in
driving through fog, a driver need not drive at such a speed as to enable him
to stop within the distance disclosed by his own headlights, as this rule would
require him to stop when he is in a very dense fog, and if one driver stops
in a fog bank until the fog clears, all must do so or the danger is thereby
increased; therefore he may proceed in a careful and prudent manner, and
7
what is careful and prudent will usually be a question for the jury.
The same consideration that prevents the application of the rule to
automobiles in cases where it would increase danger is applicable to prevent
the initial invocation of a doctrine essentially dangerous to aircraft. The
presence of these various modifications of the general rule iiv automobile
cases points the inherent weakness of a specific standard of care. Each new
fact situation necessitates its alteration while if the general "prudent man"
formula were employed alterations of fact might be brought within its broad
outlines. Impractical in all cases, the specific standard should never be employed in cases involving aircraft where the consideration affecting judgment
must needs be complex.
NEIL B. Ross.
NEGLIGENCE-DAMAGES-COMMON

LIA13ILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE.-[New
for a regularly scheduled air trip
Jersey. The ticket read in part:
pany and accepted by the holder

CARRIERS-CONTRACTUAL

LIMITATION 'OF

York] Decedent bought a passenger ticket
from Albany, New York, to Newark, New
"This passage ticket is issued by the comhereof on the following conditions: . . .

"6. That the holder voluntarily assumes the ordinary risks of air
transportation, and stipulates that the Company shall not be responsible
save for its own neglect of duty, and that the liability of the Company
to' the holder hereof or his legal representatives in case of accident resulting in death or physical disability, in any event, and under any circumstances,
is limited as follows: Class A Contract (Minimum Rate), Maximum Liability, $5,000.00, Class B Contract (Double Rate), Maximum Liability.
$10,000.00, Class C Contract (Triple Rate), Maximum Liability, $15,000.00.
"Company's ticket agents are provided with all three forms of contract.
This is a Class 'A' Contract.
"The Holder Hereof Has Read and Accepted The Foregoing Conditions
of Passage."
[Signature of holder.]
The plane in which decedent rode, and its passengers were destroyed
when, in making a landing in a fog, it struck against high tension electric
wires. In a suit by the administratrix of the estate, the jury found that the
company was negligent, and awarded damages, which by stipulation were
reduced to some $50,000. On appeal, the company did not dispute its negligence, but set up the contract limitation of liability. Held: where the
6.

(1925).

Turpie v. Oliver, 21 Alberta L R. 508, 4 D. L. R. 1023, 3 W. W. FR.687

7. DeVoto v. United Auto Transport Co.. 128 Wash.
(1924), aff'd. 130 Wash. 707. 226 P. 1118 (1924).

604, 233

P. 1050
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passenger has no opportunity to choose between full and limited liability,
with corresponding price differentials, the limitation is void as against public
policy. Conklin v. Canadian-ColonialAirways, Inc., New York, 1935.1
It is to be noted that the only choice given a passenger was between three
grades of limited liability. Had there been a standard rate for an unlimited
liability passage, and other standard rates, on a decreasing price scale, for
limited liability passage, it seems that the clause would have been valid. The
decision is directed against absolute exemption from unlimited liability for
the carrier's negligence. The court correctly points out that the great weight
2
Some states, among
of authority in this country opposes such contracts.
them being New York, allow the absolute exemption in the case of gratuitous
passage. The "voluntary choice" formula should allow air lines to reach
practically the same result attempted to be reached by the contract now
declared invalid.
There have been but few American cases before this one dealing with
airline exemption clauses. 3 Their cumulative effect has been to invalidate
almost every type of suggested limited liability contract in use. 4 The clause
which offers a choice between three grades of limited liability was here
nullified. A provision absolutely exempting the company from liability, leaving no choice of any kind, was early held to have no effect. 5 An analogous
immunity clause read: "in the event of the injury or death of the holder due
to any cause for which the Company is legally liable, the Company's liability
is limited to $10,000."
In Curtiss-Wright Flying Service v. Glose,0 it was
held invalid, on the ground that the policy of the law forbids a common carrier to compel passengers to release liability for negligence. Another device,
not limiting damages to a named sum, but intended to reduce the degree of
7
care required of the carrier, was nullified in Allison v. Standard Air Line,.
The nugatory clause provided: "Should the Company accept the holder
hereof for a flight in one of its airplanes, such acceptance shall not be deemed
to make the Company a common carrier, but it is specifically agreed and
understood between the holder and the Company that the Company is a
private carrier and is liable to the holder not as an insurer, but only for
proven negligence of its employees and agents and the mere occurrence of an
accident resulting in injury or loss of life to the holder shall not be any
evidence of negligence." The futility of attempting to contract away a legal
status and its obligations is patent.
A fourth type of clause in use provides: "This is a Class A ticket. The
fare under a Class A ticket is lower than under a Class B ticket. In consideration of said reduced fare, the passenger agrees that the company shall
1. Af'g. 242 App. Div. 625, 1934 U. S. Av. R. 21 (1934).
2. For numerous citations. see 10 C. 3., Carriers, 11154, note 75. The
court assumed without discussion that the company was a common carrier. In
Germany, it is not against public policy to contract against such liability. But
the contract will be strictly construed against the carrier. Thus the clause "By
participating in flight the passenger waives for himself and his legal representatives all claims for damages occurring mediately or immediately through
the use of the aircraft. . . ." has been held not to exempt a carrier from
liability for its negligence. See 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 219 ff.(1930).
3. The writer has been able to find only three reported, all being In the
Federal courts.
4. See J. K. Edmunds, "Aircraft Passenger Ticket Contracts," 1 JOURNAL
OF Am Lsw 321 (1930).
5. Law v. Transcontinental Air Transport, Inc., 1931 U. S. Av. R. 205
(D. C. Pa.).
6.

66 F. (2d)

710 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933).

7. 1930 U. S. Av. R. 292, aif'd. 65 F. (2d) 668 (C.C. A. 9th, 1933).
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in no event be liable to said passenger, his heir or representative, for injury
or damage to said passenger in an excess of $25,000." In view of the rule
announced in the present case, this formula will probably be given effect, at
least in New York.8
SAUL

NEGLIGENCE-FORCED

LESSOR.-[Iowa]

LANDING-CONTRACTS-ATION

N.

RITTENBERG.

FOR

DAMAGES

BY

Plaintiff conducted a flying school where he gave a course

of instruction in flying to defendant who then secured a private license from
the United States Department of Commerce. Thereafter defendant entered
into an arrangement with plaintiff whereby for consideration he was to be
allowed to use the planes belonging to plaintiff and to be responsible for
any damages sustained to a plane while he was flying. On the day of the
accident, defendant secured permission to take up an Eagle Rock biplane
belonging to plaintiff, with instructions to use it for not over fifteen minutes
-plaintiff informing defendant that there was not much gasoline in the tank
and that the latter should turn on the reserve tank. Plaintiff further instructed defendant to stay within gliding distance of the airport and not to
fly over Iowa City. Shortly after taking off, and at an altitude of about
2,000 feet, the motor started sputtering and defendant headed the plane back
toward the port, but as the plane was steadily losing altitude it appeared
to'defendant that it would he impossible for him to reach the port, and
so he turned westward and made an emergency landing on a golf course
and damaged the plane. Plaintiff sued in three counts for the resulting
damage, the first two being on the contract and later withdrawn because
defendant was a minor at the time of the alleged making of the contract,
the third charging the defendant with negligence. The case was submitted
to a jury on the third count alone and a verdict was found for the plaintiff.
Held: on appeal, reversed. There was no evidence of negligence for the
court to submit to the jury, and it was error on the part of the court to
submit as one of the grounds of negligence that the motor was working
normally at the time of the emergency landing. Shaw v. Carson, Iowa Supreme Court, decided November 13, 1934, 257 N. W. 194, 234 C. C. H. 3129.
For the first time the Iowa court has been confronted with a case involving the law of the air and its decision adds further support to the
argument that courts at the present time are not adequately equipped with
knowledge of flying technique to handle aviation cases which should rather
be submitted to a body of experts in the field. The opinion reveals not only
8. J. K. Edmunds, supra note 3,thought that even this type of clause will
be insufficient. It has not yet been Judicially tested.
An interesting conflict of laws problem is raised in the principal case. The
contract was made in New York. but the accident occurred in New Jersey.
Assuming a suit in tort. the plaintiff might well rely on the usually accepted
rule that the law of the place of injury controls. That theory was useless in
this case, of course, since the clause was void in the forum of the contract. The
court here held that the usual contract rule applies, even though the suit Is
ex delicto. and the validity was to be determined by the lew loci contractua. It
is a common device to hold, in cases of tort happening while a contractual relation exists, that the conflict of laws rules for contracts will govern, rather
those for torts. But of. Lake Shore & M, S. Ry. Co. v. Teeters, 166 Ind. than
835,
77 N. E. 899 (1906), where the contract was made in New York (where it was
valid), the injury was in Indiana (where the limitation of liability was void),
and suit was brought in Indiana. The public policy of the latter state was held
to be strong enough to overcome the usual conflicts rule.
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the awkwardness of the court in dealing with the problem but also the ineptitude of counsel in trying the case. The record presented the court was
apparently replete with misinformation, and evidence of many important
elements was omitted entirely. The proper result was reached, but in spite
of the inexpert handling of the case.
The lower court submitted to the jury three grounds of negligence:
(1) the failure of the appellant properly to make an emergency landing upon
available emergency landing field as soon as the plane (motor) commenced
to miss fire; (2) after the motor c6mmenced to miss fire, the appellant
conducted the airplane over the city of Iowa City, the Finkbine Golf Course,
and then negligently and carelessly failed to land his plane on one of the
available emergency landing areas; (3) at the time appellant reached a
point over the golf course the motor began to function normally, and at
that time no emergency landing was necessary. The Supreme Court based
its reversal entirely on the error in the last allegation of negligence, although
the first two as well might have been held erroneous.
Had the situation of this case been presented to experts, their efforts
to fix the responsibility for the crash would have been controlled by entirely
different and more determinative inquiries. The first would have involved
the experience of the defendant in emergency landing. Apparently there
was some evidence presented on this question but it was mishandled due to
the court's failure to realize the important conclusion to which it might have
been directed. The court is quite correct in its statement that "In the
training course the student is taught that the first thing a flyer of a plane
must do is to preserve life, and that as he is flying along through the air,
listening to the hum of the motor, he must keep a continual lookout for
emergency landing fields, for the ability of the plane to stay in the air and
maintain its altitude depends upon the motor that is pulling the plane ...
And so the pilot is trained to keep his eye peeled for what is known as an
emergency landing field." While there are no regulations on this point, it
is consistent with careful practice for the instructor to see that his student
pilot "assimilates" forced landings. Shaw apparently had never given Carson
such instruction since the court later states: "Carson was a young, inexperienced flyer. This was his first emergency landing. He had never before
been confronted with the necessity of picking out from a distance of two
thousand feet in the air a place to land his plane, with a motor that was not
functioning properly." In view of the fact that defendant apparently had
never even had instruction, to say nothing of practice, in forced landings,
an expert would have been driven to the conclusion either that defendant
exercised good judgment in heading for the golf course instead of trying
to make the airport, or that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent in failing
to give such instruction. Curiously enough, the defense of contributory negligence was not raised.
Certain other elements having a bearing on the conclusions to be drawn
should have been brought out and considered by the jury as well as by the
court, such as the direction and velocity of the wind, how much gas there
was available in the reserve tank, what assurance there was that the motor
had been properly maintained, and how much total flying time Carson had
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had. The evidence on the cause of the motor difficulty is most unsatisfactory,
that is, whether it was due to lack of fuel or from some mechanical trouble.
The fact that it "missed fire" for a prolonged time would normally indicate
that the motor failure was not due to lack of fuel. If, as is more plausible,
it indicated some mechanical trouble, then the condition of the motor before
Carson took the plane up should have been shown. Had the motor been
"revved" up before the take-off? How long had defendant rufn it before
taking-off? Was it operating normally when and if it was warmed up, or
did it show signs then of "missing fire"? Did the plaintiff-owner supervise
this customary preliminary process? Certainly it would constitute gross
negligence and a violation of the regulations, if the pilot (as the opinion
states) merely "cranked the motor, jumped in and took off"! At one point
it appeared that the defendant himself testified that the motor had stopped
running, and his witnesses bore him out in this conclusion. At another point
there was testimony that the condition of the propeller after the accident
showed that it must have been turning up one-half or one-quarter. The
court, giving credence to the latter testimony, naively concluded that "certainly, in view of such evidence, it could not be said that the motor was
working normally." The court was entirely misled on this point. Under
normal landing conditions the motor should be turning at minimum speed
and would not, as a matter of fact, be turning as high as one half or one
quarter. In case of a forced landing, the motor should normally be cut
entirely. The only conclusion that should have been drawn from the evidence, lacking more, is that the motor was not dead.
Another factor which is not brought out in the opinion or record is
the possibility that Carson might have glided safely to the airport. Normally,
the safe gliding ratio of a plane used for pleasure flying is seven to one.
That is, at an altitude of 2,000 feet the normal gliding distance of Carson's
plane would have been 14,000 feet or nearly enough to bring him back to
the airport-a distance of three miles. Here again, the factors of wind direction and velocity might modify this statement. The particular type of
plane used by Carson on that day, however, is notorious for its gliding ability,
having instead of the usual seven to one ratio, a ratio of approximately
eleven to one (dependent however on the type of motor used).
Taking the court's opinion piecemeal, one conclusion can be drawn: The
evidence before the court is of practically no value. Consequently, the court
is not to be criticized since it arrived at a satisfactory result without being
aided by reliable or accurate evidence.
LORRAINE ARNOLD.

DIGESTS
AIR MAILn-NULLIFICATION OF CONTRACTS DY POSTMASTER GENERAL-JURIS-

DICTION-SUITS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.-[Federal]

The United States
Supreme Court on October 15, 1934, denied the petition for writ of certiorari

in Transcontinental& Western Air, Inc. v. Farley, 234 C. C. H. 3123.
For digest of the facts in this case see 5 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 658
(1934).

NOTES, COMMENTS, DIGESTS
AIR MAIL-CANCELLATION OF CONTRACTS-REMEDY AT LAw.-[District of

Columbia] The several plaintiff-appellants had been awarded contracts for
the carrying of air mail over the various routes designated in the respective
contracts, which contracts in effect were breached by Postmaster General
Farley's order of February 9, 1934. Held: decrees dismissing the bills in
equity affirmed, since the government may not be required in equity to specifically perform its contracts and since the holders of the contracts have
an adequate and complete remedy at law if the breach of the contracts
operated to deprive them of their property rights without due process of
law. Boeing Air Transport,Inc. v. James A. Farley, National Air Transport,
Inc. v. Same, Pacific Air Transport v. Same, Varney Air Lines, Inc. v. Same.
Court of Appeals, District of Columbia, February 4, 1935. 235 C. C. H. 4001.
CONTRACTS-AGENCY TO DISTRIBUTE AIRPLANES-ASSIGNMENT-CONSTRUC-

The California Supreme Court on December 28, 1934, affirmed the decision of the California District Court of Appeals,
2nd Appellate District, adopting the opinion of the District Court of Appeals "as and for the decision of this Court." Ruckstell -Corp., Ltd. v. Great
Lakes Aircraft Corp., 89 Cal. Dec. 46.
For digest of the facts of this case, see 5 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 660
(1934).
TIoN-EviDENc.-[California]

NEGLIGENCE-AIRCRAFT COLLISION-AIR TRAFFIC RULEs-RES

IPSA LoQuI-

[California] On January 2, 1930, Fox Film Company, engaged in the
business of producing motion pictures, entered into a written contract with
TUR.-

respondent James E. Granger, Inc., to furnish one Lockheed Vega cabin plane
and two "Whirlwind planes" as camera planes, at stated prices per day, in
first-class condition and with licensed pilots to operate the same, to be used
under direction of Kenneth Hawks as director and Max Gold as assistant
director of the Fox Film Company in the filming of a picture showing a
parachute jump over the Pacific Ocean. James E. Granger, Inc., obtained
and furnished the services of a Lockheed Vega plane with Captain Roscoe
Turner as lawfully licensed pilot thereof, and made arrangements to hire
from Tanner Motor Livery, a corporation, also a respondent herein, two
Stinson planes for use as camera planes, with licensed pilots to operate the
same, agreeing to pay therefor a hire fixed in terms of dollars per hour.
These planes and pilots were offered by James E. Granger, Inc., to Fox Film
Company and by it approved and accepted for use in making the picture.
After dual controls were installed in the Stinson planes and cameras mounted
therein, and Hawks had given detailed directions as to the course of the

flight and the positions of the planes when photographing was to be done,
the flight of the three planes commenced. Captain Turner was pilot of the
Lockheed Vega, carrying the parachute jumper; Hallock Rouse, a regular
employee of Tanner Motor Livery and a lawfully licensed pilot, was pilot
of one Stinson plane, with Max Gold sitting beside him at the dual control,
and Ross Cook, also a regular employee of Tanner Motor Livery and a
lawfully licensed pilot, was pilot of the other Stinson plane, with Hawks
sitting beside him at the dual control. Neither Hawks nor Gold was a
licensed pilot. Six other employees of Fox Film Company, participating in
the picture making, were divided between the two Stinson planes. While
flying out over the bay in a general southwesterly direction on a designated
course to be followed for a distance with return thereon, the Lockheed Vega
was in the lead, one Stinson to its left and rear, the other to the left and
somewhat to the rear and below the first Stinson. The Lockheed Vega allowed the two Stinsons to pass and then made a left turn to follow the
return course. Thereupon the two Stinsons commenced to make a left
turn, when the leading one appeared to slide sideways, the tips of the wings
on the two planes touched, then their noses camd together, there was an
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explosion, and both planes fell into the ocean carrying to their death all the
occupants thereof.
Eight separate actions were commenced by the heirs or personal representatives of persons who lost their lives in a collision between two airplanes. The cases were consolidated and tried together, and from judgments
in favor of defendants these appeals are taken: Held: (1) The orders
denying the motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdicts are affirmed,
and (2) the judgments for defendants are reversed.
The flight of the planes herein mentioned was intrastate, and under the
federal Constitution and the California Aircraft Act enacted in 1929 the
state of California was vested with exclusive power to prescribe air traffic
rules to govern the operation of aircraft in flying in purely intrastate flights.
No such rules had been made by the legislature when the accident herein
occurred, and the conduct of the pilots and others involved in the accident
would be measured and judged only under the general law and rules of
negligence pertinent and applicable to the case. The federal regulations pertaining to air traffic offer nothing therein of which the court was charged
with judicial notice and which the court was called upon to declare to the
jury.
Concerning the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the court
relied upon the holding in Steele v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 168 Cal. 375, to
the effect that a prima facie case of negligence having been once established
by the evidence under the operation of the doctrine in question, the duty
devolves upon the defendant to explain how the accident occurred, and to
show that he was without negligence or that it was the result of causes
beyond his control, in order to secure relief from responsibility. Thomas
H. Parker v. James E. Granger, Inc., -Cal. App -, 39 P. (2d) 833 (Dec. 31,
1934).

